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COLD WAR TRIUMPH? TAIWAN DEMOCRATIZED IN SPITE OF U.S.
EFFORTS
Jim W. Kot
I. Introduction
Taiwan, a small island off the southeast coast of China, emerged from
under the rule of martial law in 1987 to become a full-fledged democracy,
all within a decade and a half, and without bloodshed. President Lee Teng-
hui, head of the Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist party that had ruled
Taiwan since it fled from mainland China in 1949, instituted and won
Taiwan's first democratic presidential election in 1996. The nascent
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) subsequently shocked the world when
its candidate Chen Shui-bian emerged victorious in the 2000 election, in
what has been accurately described as the first democratic transition of
power in China's 5,000 year history.
After decades of promoting the KMT as the rightful ruler of "Free
China," the U.S. led the world-wide transfer of recognition from the KMT
to Mao Tse-tung's People's Republic of China (PRC) in the 1970s,
inducing a decade of crisis in Taiwan. This U.S. betrayal would have
sparked a negative backlash against the U.S. and its ideals in almost any
other country. Instead, it ultimately spurred democratic reform in Taiwan,
but only in a haphazard manner akin to the devastating earthquake that
changed the landscape of Taiwan and its politics shortly before the DPP's
historic victory in 2000. Several factors internal to Taiwan far outweighed
any positive influences the U.S. might have had. Simply put, the U.S.
lucked out.
The Taiwan example calls not for emulation but for fundamental shifts
in U.S. efforts to promote democratization abroad. U.S. economic aid and
military protection were in fact instrumental to Taiwan's survival in the
face of the ever-present threat of PRC invasion, and also laid the foundation
for Taiwan's economic miracle. Taiwan's democratic reform, however, did
not succeed because of U.S. efforts, but rather in spite of them. The
authoritarian KMT adopted domestic policies virtually opposite to the
failed policies imposed by the U.S. on nascent democracies during the Cold
War and today. For decades the KMT maintained tightly protectionist
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economic policies and implemented token elections solely on the local, not
national level, and certainly not on the presidential level. The U.S. chose to
overlook the KMT's anti-democratic indiscretions, but only because it
wanted to present Taiwan to the world as a pristine, if not genuine,
democratic alternative to Communist China. Nevertheless in the end, the
rose-colored glasses worn by the U.S. for decades had unwittingly allowed
Taiwanese democracy to develop internally and at its own pace, as perhaps
any strong democracy must.
The Taiwan example demonstrates that the U.S. should permit
incipient democracies to maintain protectionist economic policies for a
period of time, and it should also look for opportunities to encourage
democratic reform from within ruling parties, instead of focusing solely on
supporting opposition movements. An authoritarian ruler might be willing
to put the implementation of local elections on the bargaining table under
the right circumstances, as the KMT's Chiang Kai-shek did in the early
1950s. Such local elections, even those not free of corruption, can fuel the
democratic impulses of the people, and eventually give rise to the national
elections that the U.S. all too often has prematurely imposed on third-world
nations.
Section II of this paper examines the justifications under accepted
international practices for the U.S. active promotion of democratization
abroad. Section III provides a historical overview of Taiwan's rapid
economic and democratic development in the second-half of the 20th
century. Finally, the largely internal factors contributing to Taiwan's
transition to democracy, despite U.S. interference, are analyzed in Section
IV.
11. The U.S. is justified in promoting democratization abroad under
accepted international practices
Although the texts of international agreements are unclear on the
matter, the U.S. is justified, under accepted international practices, in using
peaceful means to promote democratic reform abroad. The lesson from the
U.S.' misguided Cold War policies, however, is that the U.S. should
fundamentally redefine and exercise more humility in its approach.
Lori Fisler Damrosch points out that the definition of the norm of
nonintervention in international law agreements is outdated.' According to
Article II of the Charter, the United Nations shall not unilaterally "intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
'"The nonintervention norm must be reformulated to deal with the categories of political
activity that the international legal system of today treats as unacceptable." Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. IINT'L. L. 1, 6 (1989).
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•. ."(emphasis added).2 The U.N. Charter grants only the Security Council
the authority to take measures "to maintain or restore international peace or
security" in response to any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression." Nevertheless, the U.N. has never enforced or submitted to
a strict interpretation of these policies. The U.N. tolerates and even
encourages certain forms of transboundary political activity, such as
government-to-government aid in support of democratic reform, and
economic sanctions and trade embargos penalizing human rights
violations.4  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law parallels
this reasoning in its application of the norm of nonintervention to human
rights: "A state may criticize another state for failure to abide by recognized
international human rights standards, and shape its trade, aid or other
national policies so as to dissociate itself from the violating state or to
influence that state to discontinue the violations." 5
According to Damrosch, international agreements regarding the norm
of nonintervention should be reformulated to reflect its actual practice. A
state's actions should violate international law only if they "deny thepeople
of another [state] the opportunity to exercise free political choice." This
reformulation would cover both forcible means and certain nonforcible
means deemed unacceptable by the international community.7
Although the U.S. is justly criticized for both the manner in which it
implemented its Cold War policies, and the ideological grounds that drove
them, the U.S.'s promotion of democratization abroad need not solely be an
exercise in self-interested imperialism. Samuel Huntington points out a
correlation between democratization and peace, as while "[a]uthoritarian
countries have fought democratic countries and have fought each other,"
democracies have not fought any significant wars with other democracies
since the early 19th century. Also, as Amartya Sen famously stated, a
functional democracy, whether rich or poor, has never suffered through a
famine like Ukraine in the 1930s or China from 1958-61.9
Even if, however, the goal of world-wide democratization is just, the
U.S. should recognize that encouraging democratic reform from the outside
is a tricky business. As Huntington writes, "The causes of democratization
differ substantially from one place to another and from one time to
2 UN Charter art. 2, para. 7.
3 UN Charter art. 39.
4 See Damrosch, supra note 1, at 49.
5 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §703 cmt. f (1987).
6 Damrosch, supra note 1, at 6.
71d. at 5.
8 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 29 (U. of Okla. Press 1993) (1991).
9 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 16 (Knopf 1999).
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another," with no single factor necessary or sufficient to a nascent
democracy's success. 10 The U.S. often forgets that intervening in the
internal affairs of another nation almost inevitably engenders a negative
backlash against the intervener and its ideals.
M. The development of "the Taiwan miracles" - economic and democratic
"The Taiwan miracle" is a phrase often used to describe Taiwan's rise
from poor agricultural nation to world economic power, all within the
period of a few decades during the second half of the 20th century. This
same phrase is equally applicable to the rapid democratic reform that
followed in Taiwan, which culminated with the first democratic transition
of power in China's 5,000 year history. This transformation was all the
more remarkable as Taiwan is perhaps the only non-Western country to
successfully transition to democracy without having previously been
subject to Western colonial rule. 1
The U.S. would play a significant role in Taiwan's democratization,
but one that was more indirect than that evident in the U.S.'s more
interventionist policies in other incipient democracies during the Cold War
and today. The U.S. played a direct and instrumental role in Taiwan's
development through its aid in implementing land reform in the 1950s, and
its continuous military protection of Taiwan from the ever-present threat of
the mainland. As for direct political pressure for democratization, however,
the U.S. allowed the KMT's authoritarian-at-heart Presidents Chiang Kai-
shek and then his son Chiang Ching-kuo free rein for decades without much
if any criticism. The lesson from Taiwanese democratization is that direct
U.S. pressure for democratic ideals such as economic liberalization,
national elections, and a free press, while potentially beneficial at pivotal
moments, may in fact be counterproductive if applied continuously and
from the start. Taiwan was given a space and time to develop its
democratic institutions on its own that has clearly not been present in
Afghanistan and Iraq today.
This section will trace the historical development leading to both of
Taiwan's miracles: from the establishment of KMT rule in Taiwan, to the
development of the Tang-wai opposition and the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), to President Chiang Ching-kuo and President Lee Teng-hui's
implementation of democratic reform, and ending with the DPP and Chen
Shui-bian's historic victory in the 2000 Presidential Election.
10 HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 38.
11 JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN'S MID-1990s ELECTIONS 138 (1998).
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A. The Establishment of Kuomintang Party (KMT) Rule
Taiwan began the 20th century under Japanese occupation, and then
became the home for Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government after it was
forced off the Chinese mainland by Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). The KMT stubbornly continued to claim sovereignty over all
of China, and used its long-term goal of retaking the mainland to justify
martial law. With U.S. support, the KMT consolidated its rule in Taiwan
and instituted a period of remarkable economic growth widely known as the
"Taiwan miracle."
1. Japanese occupation (1895-1945)
Toward the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), China suffered
major military defeat at the hands of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
95). As part of the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China was forced
to cede the island of Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Japan sought to make
Taiwan a model colony, and invested heavily in Taiwan's infrastructure and
educational system. 12 This would help set the stage for Taiwan's rapid
economic growth under the KMT, after Japan returned Taiwan to Chinese
rule at the end of World War II.
2. Chiang Kai-shek's KMT Party flees mainland China and takes
over Taiwan (1949)
After leading the Revolutionary Alliance to victory against the last
emperor of China in February 1912, Dr. Sun Yat-sen created the
Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist party. Dr. Sun established a democratic
system of government, with a Constitution to prescribe its powers. Not
surprisingly, several other regional leaders had similar but less democratic
aspirations to rule China, and China fell into a period of warlordism. Dr.
Sun resurrected the KMT party in 1920, and Chiang Kai-shek emerged as
its military leader.
In its efforts to reunite China and bring it out of warlordism, the KMT
allied with the Stalin-backed Chinese Communist party (CCP), created in
12 Tun-jen Cheng, Transforming Taiwan's Economic Structure in the 2 0 th Century, in
TAIWAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 19, 20-22, 24 (Richard Louis
Edmonds & Steven M. Goldstein eds., 2001).
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1921.13 Sun Yat-sen reorganized the KMT on the model of the Soviet
Communist party in 1924,1 but maintained it as a "leaderist" party'5 with a
system of democratic centralism requiring cadres to be elected and policies
to be decided by discussion.1 6 The alliance between the KMT and the CCP
fell apart in 1927, leading to civil war.
Japan invaded China in 1937, marking the start of World War II for
Asia. From 1938 to 1944, Japan took over much of eastern China, with the
KMT marred by internal corruption and preoccupied with its civil war with
the CCP.17 The KMT survived the Japanese threat, largely due to the U.S.'
role in turning the tide of the "War of the Pacific." The CCP, however,
began to dominate the civil war.
In 1949, the CCP forced Chiang and his KMT forces to retreat to the
island of Taiwan. The CCP leader Mao Zedong declared the founding of
the People's Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, Chiang's KMT
government took over rule of Taiwan. The KMT brought with it the
Constitution created by Chiang in 1946, which was based on the teachings
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the U.S. Constitution.1
8
Chiang Kai-shek's KMT party came to Taiwan as a decidedly minority
ruler. The KMT had 34,382 members, representing only 0.8% of the entire
Taiwanese population.' 9 Chiang Kai-shek's immigrant KMT party and its
descendants are referred to this day as "mainlanders" (waishengren, or
"people from outside provinces"), in contrast to the "native Taiwanese, ' '20
13 A young Mao Zedong was one of those CCP members assigned the task of stirring up
revolution in the countryside. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 355-
56 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1990).
14 Bruce J. Dickson, The Kuomingtang before Democratization: Organizational Change
and the Role of Elections, in TAIWAN's ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
42, 45 (Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
15 COPPER, supra note 11, at 12.
16 Steve Tsang, Transforming a Party State into a Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN
TAIWAN 1, 5 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., Hong Kong University Press 1999).
17 SPENCE, supra note 13, at 437-438.
18 See Piero Tozzi, Note, Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of
Democratic Sovereignty?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1193, 1233 (1995).
19 Teh-fu Huang, Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang, in TAIWAN'S
ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, 114 (Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
20 Scholars typically refer to this group more broadly as the "Taiwanese." See ALAN M.
WACHMAN, Competing Identities in Taiwan, in THE OTHER TAIWAN: 1945 TO THE PRESENT
17, 23 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 1994). This article will refer to them as the "native
Taiwanese" to clearly distinguish them from the "mainlanders." The "native Taiwanese" are
ancestors of immigrants from mainland China, and had controlled the island for centuries
before KMT rule. They are not to be confused with the aboriginal tribes in Taiwan.
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(bendiren, or "people of this place") who now make up 85% of the
population.2'
3. The KMT suppresses dissent with the 2-28 massacre and the
temporary provisions suspending the Constitution (1948-1991)
Despite the U.S.' promotion of Taiwan to the world as the democratic
alternative to Communist China, the KMT suppressed all forms of dissent.
The most prominent symbol of KMT authoritarianism is the "2-28
Massacre" which took place in 1947, two years before Chiang Kai-shek
transferred his KMT government to Taiwan.
After its return from Japanese rule in 1945, the island of Taiwan had
been peripheral to the plans of the KMT in its civil war against the
Communists. Chiang Kai-shek placed Taiwan under the corrupt
administration of Chen Yi. Tensions between the KMT and the native
Taiwanese came to a head on February 28, 1947 as the police beating of a
woman selling contraband cigarettes turned into an island-wide riot. The
KMT imprisoned thousands and carried out mass executions in the cities of
Taipei, Kaohsiung and Keelung.22 The subsequent terror "cowed Taiwan's
educated class and social elite into a silence that lasted for decades."23
When the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, it continued its imposition of
the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization for
the Suppression of Communist Rebellion," started the year before. The
Temporary Provisions suspended certain sections of the Constitution, and
banned the formation of new political parties.24 The KMT subsequently
imposed martial law on Taiwan, restricting public gatherings, criminalizing
dissident activity, outlawing new political parties, and freezing the number
of newspaper licenses.2 5 The KMT also preemptively infiltrated every facet
of civil society, and thus was able to "monitor, control, and deactivate
potential opposition in all social sectors., 26  The KMT justified these
measures as necessary for achieving its pipe dream of retaking the Chinese
mainland from the Communists.27
The U.S. was ready to withdraw its support of the KMT as rightful
ruler of China in the late 1940s because of the KMT's corruption and
21 Robert A. Scalapino, Foreword to TAIWAN'S ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION ix, xii (Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
22 SHELLEY RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN: VOTING FOR DEMOCRACY 57-58 (1999).
2 3 id.
24 JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN: NATION STATE OR PROVINCE? 95 (3rd ed. 1999).
25 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 71-73.
26 HUANG, supra note 19, at 108.
27 See ALAN M. WACHMAN, TAIWAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 186-88
(1994).
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incompetence.28 The U.S., however, reversed its position with the outbreak
of the Korean War, when President Truman sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet to
the Taiwan Strait to protect Taiwan from the mainland. 29 The U.S. now
viewed Taiwan as a cornerstone for the containment of communism in
Asia,30 and made its security commitment official with the 1954 U.S.-
R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty.31 Over the vehement opposition of the
PRC, U.S. support allowed the KMT government in Taiwan to retain
China's seat in the United Nations and other international organizations
after it fled the mainland.32 This renewal of U.S. support of the KMT,
however, had everything to do with external political reasons, and nothing
to do with any true push for democracy within Taiwan itself.
4. Taiwan's economic miracle
Under the Temporary Provisions, the KMT led Taiwan through a
period of economic growth and prosperity that it is widely known as the
"Taiwan miracle." In the 1950s, Taiwan was poorer than most African
countries today.33 During the second half of the 20th century, Taiwan's per
capita GNP skyrocketed from $167 in 1953 to $3,784 in 1986 to $10,566 in
1993, 34 leading the world in this category for the period 1968 to 1998.31 In
2001, Taiwan was the 14th leading exporter and 16th leading importer of
merchandise in the world,36 despite being an island about the size of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut combined.37
The U.S. helped start Taiwan's economic boom, providing substantial
direct economic aid, and assisting Taiwanese engineers and economists,
28 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 59.
29 SPENCE, supra note 13, at 528-529.
30 Chyuan-jenq Shiau, Civil Society and Democratization, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN
TAIWAN 101, 104 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., Hong Kong University Press 1999).
31 Yun-han Chu & Jih-wen Lin, Political Development in the 2 0'h Century Taiwan: State-
Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity, in TAIWAN IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 102, 113 (Richard Louis Edmonds and
Steven M. Goldstein ed., 2001). Taiwan is known officially as the Republic of China
(R.O.C.).
32 Shiau, supra note 30, at 104.
33 DANi RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING
OPENNESS WORK 39 (1999).
34 Tsang, supra note 16, at 10.
35 COPPER, supra note 24, at 156, n.63.
36 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2002, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/statise/its2002e/its02_bysubjecte.htm#trading leaders
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
37 COPPER, supra note 24, at 2.
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mostly educated in the West,38 in implementing land reform policies in the
1950S.39 The KMT, however, refused to open up its economy for decades.
In 1953, the KMT government adopted a strategy of import substitution,
with direct subsidies, tariffs and price supports, to replace imports with
products made in Taiwan. These protectionist policies boosted domestic
production and industrial capacity,40 and encouraged "rapid economic
growth, especially in the industrial sector. '41 Taiwan then shifted to an
export-promotion policy in the 1960s, providing government support for
capital and knowledge-intensive industries.42
Taiwan's rapid economic growth, started through its protectionist
policies, directly contributed to its subsequent push for democratic reform.
As Huntington points out, poverty is "probably the principal obstacle to
democratic development. ' '43 AlonA the way, the corrupt KMT became the
richest political party in the world, a point not lost upon the opposition.
B. Development of the Tang-wai Opposition
An opposition movement to the KMT grew out of the native
Taiwanese population and came to be known as the "Tang-wai" (meaning
"outside the party"). The Tang-wai mobilized around KMT corruption and
Taiwan's declining international status in the 1970s. Through publications
and demonstrations, the Tang-wai engaged the KMT in a "cat-and-mouse
game" testing the limits of its tolerance,45 which culminated with the
Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. This incident, along with the murder of
Taiwan's Henry Liu on U.S. soil in 1984, finally sparked U.S. criticism of
the long-oppressive KMT government. The KMT struggled to balance its
authoritarian instincts against its fear of losing domestic and international
favor.46
38 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 68-69.
39 Dickson, supra note 14, at 46. "[F]rom the early 1950s to 1960, U.S. aid provided 40
percent of Taiwan's capital formation, most of it helping the industrial sector." COPPER,
supra note 24, at 134.
40 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 69.
41 Scalapino, supra note 21, at x.
42 COPPER, supra note 24, at 135, 138-39.
43 HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 311 (emphasis added).
44 COPPER, supra note 11, at 53; "Conservative estimates place the worth of this empire at
about U.S. $9 billion with yearly dividends exceeding U.S. $140 million." Cheng-Tian Kuo,
Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective, in TAIWAN IN PERSPECTIVE 85,
94 (Wei-Chin Lee, ed., 2000).
45 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 113.
' Id. at 113.
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1. Taiwan's declining international status due to the U.S. betrayal
in the 1970s spurred the Tang-wai
National crises are inherently destabilizing, and under the right
circumstances may lead to a push for democratization. The 1970s were the
darkest period in Taiwan's postwar history, both politically and
economically. After decades of holding Taiwan up to the world as the
"Free China" alternative to Communist China, the U.S. betrayed Taiwan
and started the world-wide shift of diplomatic recognition from the KMT to
the PRC. 47  As Taiwan lost legitimacy internationally, the Tang-wai
opposition mobilized, and the KMT was forced to try to regain legitimacy
at home as well as abroad.48
Throughout the 1950s and '60s, the KMT government stubbornly
continued to demand international recognition as the sole and rightful ruler
of China (the KMT's original "one-China" policy), despite the clear
consolidation of PRC rule on the Chinese mainland. This was "the most
thorny obstacle to Taiwan's efforts to gain international recognition and
democratize. 'A9 Under the pressure of the Kennedy administration, Chiang
Kai-shek reluctantly gave up his plans for waging military operations on the
mainland in 1961-62.50  The KMT government finally decided to
contemplate dual recognition of Taiwan and the PRC in the 1990s, but by
this time, the PRC was strong enough to demand sole recognition for
itself.5 '
Eventually practical considerations became more important than
ideological obligations for the U.S. When a unique opportunity to develop
relations with the future world power, China, presented itself, President
Nixon seized it. Nixon's visit to China in 1972 started a wave of
international recognition of the PRC, at the expense of the KMT. On the
eve of the United Nations' vote on the matter in 1972, the outcome was
already clear, and the KMT preemptively withdrew from the UN out of
protest.
52
The loss of its UN seat meant much more than simple international
embarrassment for Taiwan. As a result of its subsequent loss of diplomatic
47 Henry Kissinger later noted in his memoirs, "[N]o government less deserved what was
about to happen to it than that of Taiwan." SPENCE, supra note 13, at 630.
48 Scalapino, supra note 21, at xi.
49 Shiau, supra note 30, at 109.
50 Chu & Lin, supra note 31, at 117.
51 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 61.
52 Shiau, supra note 30, at 104-5.
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ties with most countries in the early 1970s, 53 Taiwanese passports were no
longer accepted by most countries, hamstringing Taiwanese business and
travel.54 Taiwan's international isolation also made it an area of high risk
for foreign investment,55 which compounded its economic struggles
resulting from the world-wide oil crisis of 1973. The U.S.' disengagement
from Vietnam and Asia sparked fears that the U.S. might also withdraw its
military protection of Taiwan. Taiwan's dark decade was capped with
President Carter's normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC in 1979, at
the cost of severing U.S. ties with Taiwan. Taiwan's international standing
would only begin to recover in 1989, after the PRC carried out the
Tiananmen massacre.
Angered by the fact that it was not consulted in President Carter's
decisions, the anti-Communist U.S. Congress demanded concessions.56
With the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty set to expire in January 1980,
the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. The
TRA provided for the continued U.S. military protection of Taiwan against
mainland China, and for arms sales to Taiwan "in such quantity as may be
necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 57  It also
established the American Institute of Taiwan, an unofficial U.S. embassy in
Taipei. The TRA did not, however, clearly define the U.S. stance on
whether Taiwan was a "renegade province" as the PRC insisted (the PRC's
"one-China" policy), whether Taiwan should eventually reunify with the
mainland on equal terms (the KMT's revised "one-China" policy), or
whether Taiwan was a completely independent nation (the "two-Chinas" or
"Taiwanese Independence" policy). It also left unclear the exact
circumstances that would give rise to U.S. military intervention on behalf of
Taiwan. The deliberately ambiguous TRA has been the foundation of U.S.
foreign policy towards Taiwan and the PRC to this day, effectively
maintaining the status quo in the region for two decades.
In the eyes of the developing Tang-wai opposition, Taiwan's setbacks
in international diplomacy and clear inability to retake the mainland meant
that the KMT's justifications for martial law no longer held water. 58
53 To this day, Taiwan is left with few diplomatic partners, comprised mostly of small,
developing countries in Central and South America and the South Pacific. RIGGER, supra
note 22, at 61.
54 Shiau, supra note 30, at 110.
55 id..
56 Steven M. Goldstein & Randall Schriver, An Uncertain Relationship: The United
States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act, in TAIWAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A
RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 147, 148 (Richard Louis Edmonds & Steven M. Goldstein eds., 2001).
57 Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 13 Stat. 14 §3(a) (1979). Goldstein and
Schriver, supra note 56, at 150.
58 Chua Beng Huat, Defeat of the KMT: Implications for One-Party Quasi-Democratic
Regimes in Southeast Asia, in TAIWAN'S PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND
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Taiwan's decade of crisis brought upon by U.S. betrayal ended up forcing
the KMT to push for more democratic reform to both appease the masses
and regain international favor.
2. KMT vote-buying and alliances with factions and the mafia
Alliances between the KMT and local factions 59 "helped maintain the
stability of the authoritarian system for many years. '60 By controlling most
of the country's economic and political resources, the KMT maintained
power by controlling local factions and the mafia through a system of
patronage,6 1 and by "turning a blind eye to vote buying and corruption.
62
Chiang Kai-shek also implemented electoral laws and structures
advantageous to the party in power.63 Furthermore, the KMT held the leash
on the anticorruption watchdog, the Control Yuan, by controlling the
selection of its members.64
Nevertheless, the U.S. would continue its public adulation of
Taiwanese democracy until the 1980s.
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 133, 136 (Muthiah Alagappa ed.,
2001).
59 "A person is in a faction if he or she exchanges favors with other faction members; no
ceremony or formal act indicates a person has joined a faction... Factions are inherently
vague and ambiguous." JOSEPH Bosco, Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State
in Local Politics, in THE OTHER TAIWAN: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 114, 123 (Murray A.
Rubenstein ed., 1994).
60 Hung-mao Tien, Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development, in TAIWAN'S
ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 3, 8 (Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
61 Huang, supra note 19, at 107-08.
62 Rigger, supra note 22, at 149.
63 The KMT prohibited candidates from coordinating campaign efforts across electoral
districts, which reduced the chance of any possible emergence of an opposition party.
Huang, supra note 19, at 107. Furthermore, the KMT inherited an electoral system from
Japanese rule called the "Single Non-Transferable Vote" (SNTV) Electoral System that was
advantageous for well-organized parties. Under this system, instead of running for particular
seats for which there would be only two or three candidates in the U.S. party system,
candidates run for multiple seats within multimember districts. For example, five candidates
might run for three seats, and the three candidates receiving the most votes wins. Each voter
has only one vote within his or her multimember district. As the most organized party, the
KMT was usually able to achieve an optimal allocation of the votes available to them,
further reducing the seats available to any opposition. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, The SNTV
System and Its Political Implications, in TAIwAN'S ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION 193, 193-209 (Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
64 JAUSHIEH JOSEPH Wu, TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION 127 (1995). For an introduction to
Taiwan's five branches of government, called "Yuans", see supra Part IV.A. L.a.
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As Shelley Rigger puts it, "It is hard to say which is more difficult:
finding someone in Taiwan who denies that vote buying exists, or finding
concrete evidence to prove that it does." 65 Taiwan's elections are
"inordinately expensive." 66 As the Tang-wai opposition developed in the
1970s and '80s, the KMT felt compelled to promise more and more spoils
of office to the local factions. 67 Published reports on vote-buying priced
votes at NT $500-$2000 per eligible voter,68 or roughly US $20-$100. As
recently as 1994, one-quarter of elected council representatives at the town
level and one-third at the county-city level had known gang connections.69
Corrupt elections, plus a propensity for in-session slapping and water-
throwing brawls, 70 made for a Legislative Yuan that is the laughing-stock of
the world.71
This system, however, changed from KMT tool to KMT thorn within a
generation, as it energized the Tang-wai opposition. The 1977 elections
were a major turning point, as a split between the KMT and the local
factions allowed the Tang-wai to gain a foothold in electoral politics. 72 The
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would grow out of the Tang-wai and
eventually adopt as its platform the end of KMT corruption. In large part
due to the role of the DPP, the problem of vote-buying was "appreciably
less" as early as the 1994 elections. 73 Chen Shui-bian rode his platform of
ending "black-gold" politics to victory in the historic 2000 Presidential
Election. Nevertheless, given the widespread reports of elected KMT
officials embezzling relief funds for the devastating September 1999
earthquake, 74 and a current vote-buying scandal implicating several DPP
65 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 94.
66 James A. Robinson, Local Elections in Taiwan, 1993-94: Appraising Steps in
Democratization, in COPPER, supra note 11, at 159, 160-61.
67 Dickson, supra note 14, at 42, 43.
68 Tien, supra note 60, at 19.
69 Kuo, supra note 44, at 96. Some candidates publicly made part of their platform their
need of the privilege of immunity given to office holders so they could stay out of jail.
COPPER, supra note 11, at 77.
70 See COPPER, supra note 11, at 64; WACHMAN, supra note 27, at 186-88.
71 See Yun-han Chu, The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation, in DEMOCRATIZATION
IN TAIWAN 148, 153 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., Hong Kong University Press
1999).
72 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 114.
73 See COPPER, supra note 11, at 122.
74 See Richard Louis Edmonds, Aspects of the Taiwanese Landscape in the 21Yh Century,
in TAIWAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTuRY: A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 1, 16 (Richard Louis
Edmonds & Steven M. Goldstein eds., 2001).
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officials in the city of Kaohsiung,75 it is clear that corruption will be a major
issue in Taiwanese politics for years to come.
3. The Senior Parliamentarian problem
A major symbol of the inherent unfairness of the KMT government
was the so-called "senior parliamentarian problem." The Tang-wai rallied
around this redundant administrative structure used by the KMT to maintain
control over "democratic" Taiwan.
When the KMT fled the mainland, it brought an entire administrative
apparatus designed to rule not just Taiwan but all of China.76 The KMT's
governmental structure optimistically included a central government with
representation from all the provinces of mainland China, and a separate
provincial government for the province of Taiwan.7 7 Under the Temporary
Provisions, the central governmental representatives, called "senior
parliamentarians," remained frozen in office for over forty years, pending a
retaking of the Chinese mainland that would never happen.78 These senior
parliamentarians dominated the KMT, constituting 91% of the National
Assembly and 76% of the Legislative Yuan as late as 1988. 79 This
bureaucratic structure served as a major impediment to democratic reform,
and a blatant injustice around which the Tang-wai opposition mobilized.
In response to cries from the opposition, President Lee Teng-hui would
call a National Affairs Conference in 1990, which recommended among
other things the abolishment of the senior parliamentarians. In 1991, they
would agree to finally give up their seats in exchange for very handsome
pensions.
4. The Kaohsiung Incident (1979) polarizes the Tang-wai
The modern polarizing event for the Tang-wai opposition, akin to the
2-28 Massacre of 1947, was the Kaohsiung Incident of December 1979.
75 At the end of 2002, a DPP politician named Chu An-hsiung won the election for
Kaohsiung City Council speaker, allegedly by buying the votes of his fellow councilors.
DPP Says Its Clean Reputation Intact, TAIPEI TIMES, December 26, 2002, at
http://th.gio.tw/show.cfm?news-id = 16343.
76 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 63.
77 Id. at 61,63.
7 Id. at 63.
79 Id.
80 Hung-mao Tien & Tun-jen Cheng, Crafting Democratic Institutions, in
DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN 23, 27 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., Hong Kong
University Press 1999).
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The U.S. had officially normalized its relations with the PRC earlier that
year, at the expense of the KMT. Subsequently, the KMT postponed the
upcoming local elections in Taiwan, citing global instability. 8' Tang-wai
activists protested, and formed the Formosa opposition faction.8 2
The Formosa faction sponsored a December 1 0 th rally commemorating
International Human Rights Day, to be held in Kaohsiung city.83 A riot
erupted. Although no one was killed, the KMT reacted by arresting the
entire Formosa leadership, many of whom were candidates in the upcoming
elections. While most of the public had previously disapproved of
Formosa's tactics, the prisoners won the sympathies of a significant
minority of Taiwan's electorate.84 Several of the imprisoned candidates'
wives or attorneys stood in their places in the 1980 elections, 8 5 and the
Tang-wai received 41% of the vote, its highest share ever.86
The Kaohsiung Incident served as a springboard for Taiwan's rapid
democratization in the 1980s and '90s. Without the opposition's "credible
threat to take to the street," the reformers from within the KMT would not
have been as persuasive. 7 The Kaohsiung trials attracted the attention of
Amnesty International, which labeled the defendants, "prisoners of
conscience." 88 The U.S. Congress openly expressed concern for Taiwan's
human rights for the first time when it passed the Taiwan Relations Act that
year.89 Furthermore, much of the DPP's future leadership, including the
DPP's winning ticket in the landmark 2000 Presidential Election, was
directly involved in the Incident. President Chen Shui-bian was a defense
lawyer for the Kaohsiung defendants, 90 and his Vice-President Annette Lu
was one of those imprisoned.9'
81 PETER R. MOODY, JR., POLITICAL CHANGE ON TAIWAN: A STUDY OF RULING PARTY
ADAPTABILITY 83 (1992); RIGGER, supra note 22, at 116.
82 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 116-17.
83 WACHMAN, supra note 27, at 140.
84 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 118.
85 MOODY, JR., supra note 81, at 83.
86 Dickson, supra note 14, at 61.
87 TIEN & CHENG, supra note 80, at 25.
88 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 117.
89 COPPER, supra note 11, at 27.
90 SHELLEY RIGGER, FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER: TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE
PARTY 21 (2001).
9' Id. at 187.
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5. The murder of Henry Liu sparks U.S. criticism of the KMT
The major event that finally gave rise to open U.S. criticism of
Taiwanese democracy was the 1984 murder of Henry Liu, a Taiwanese
journalist living in San Francisco. 92  Liu had written an unflattering
biography of then President Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang's son, Hsiao-wu,
allegedly retaliated by ordering the hit. After the murder, President Reagan
began pressuring the KMT to implement democratic reform.93 In 1986,
after holding hearings on Taiwanese democracy and traveling to Taiwan to
observe elections,9 4 the U.S. Congress called on the KMT to lift martial
law.95 Some members of Congress tried to make continued arms sales
contingent on Taiwan's progress in democratic reforms.
96
This U.S. criticism of the KMT's anti-democratic practices certainly
played a role in Taiwanese democratization, but it only started in earnest
after over three decades of KMT authoritarian rule. Taiwanese democracy
had been given room to develop for decades free of constant U.S. scrutiny,
unlike those in Afghanistan and Iraq today.
C. President Chiang Ching-kuo: Self-Interested Democratizer
While citizens of most countries subject to authoritarian rule vote out
the ruling party at the first opportunity, the KMT remarkably remained in
power throughout Taiwan's implementation of national elections in the
1990s. This was in large part because KMT President Chiang Ching-kuo
and then President Lee Teng-hui skillfully led the drive for democracy
themselves in the 1980s and '90s, albeit mostly out of self-interest, and only
with the belief that they could contain its effects.
April 1975 marked the death of the authoritarian Chiang Kai-shek,
president since he led the KMT flight from the Chinese mainland in 1949.
Thejarty leaders' loyalty to the father did not automatically transfer to the
son. Chiang Ching-kuo, premier since 1972, had to overcome the
dominant conservative faction of the KMT to rise to the presidency in 1978.
Chiang Ching-kuo's strategy was to appeal directly to the people, arguing
92 See Ian Buruma, Taiwan's New Nationalists, FOREIGN AFF. July-Aug. 1996 at 77,88;
COPPER, supra note 11, at 28.
93 Ian Buruma, Taiwan's New Nationalists, FOREIGN AFF. July-Aug. 1996 at 77 88.
94 COPPER, supra note 11, at 28.
95 Buruma, supra note 92, at 88.
96 COPPER, supra note 11, at 28.
97 Dickson, supra note 14, at 52.
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that Taiwan would not survive long without reform, given its increasingly
precarious international position.
98
Chiang Ching-kuo spear-headed Taiwan's democratization. To satisfy
the native Taiwanese that represented over 75% of new KMT recruits by
1974,99 Chiang opened up the KMT leadership with an active
indigenization or "Taiwanization policy." Native Taiwanese representation
in the KMT Central Committee would go up from 14.6% in 1976, just
before Chiang Ching-kuo became president, to 34.4% in 1988, the year of
his death. 100 In 1982, Chiang Ching-kuo took the unprecedented step of
naming as Vice-President a native Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, raising the ire
of the KMT conservatives.
Chiang Ching-kuo's most important contribution to Taiwanese
democracy, however, was one of restraint. In 1986, the Tang-wai
opposition dared to form a new party named the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP). At the time, the formation of new political parties was still
illegal under the Temporary Provisions that had been in place since 1948.
Chiang's father had previously thrown Lei Chan, the leader of a would-be
political party, in jail for ten years in 1960.101 Ignoring the calls of the
KMT conservatives, Chiang Ching-kuo announced to the world, in an
interview with the Washington Post's Katherine Graham, that he would
allow the formation of the DPP and other new parties. The only
requirement was these new parties would have to support the KMT's
revised "one-China" policy of eventual reunification with the mainland, and
oppose communism. °2 The number of political parties would explode,
from the lone KMT party in 1986 to 82 parties by 1996.103
In this same Washington Post interview, Chiang announced his
intention to lift martial law, which he carried out the following year. 1°4
This removed most restrictions on large-scale protests, thus providing the
primary vehicle for the rise of the DPP. Additionally, it transferred the
supervision of the media from the military to the Executive Yuan. 10 5 Scores
of newspapers popped up, 10 6 and Taiwan would become known for its
"vigorous journalism." 107
98 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 80.
99 Dickson, supra note 14, at 56.
100 Huang, supra note 19, at 118.
101 Dickson, supra note 14, at 47.
102 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 126.
103 I-chou Liu, The Development of the Opposition, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN 67,
67 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., Hong Kong University Press 1999).
104 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 126, 128.
105 Id. at 128.
"'61d at 129.
107 Robinson, supra note 66, at 160.
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Later, in October 1987, the Executive Yuan lifted the ban on
Taiwanese travel to mainland China, under Chiang Ching-kuo's direction.
Although officially no direct travel or investment was permitted, the KMT
tacitly allowed Taiwanese businesspeople to set up manufacturing plants
and export businesses on the mainland. 0 8 By 1993, estimates of these
business interests reached as high as U.S. $15 billion.109
Although there is legitimate concern as to the effects this will have on
Taiwanese labor and domestic production, many observers believe that
establishing such business connections between Taiwan and China will be
the key to long-term peace in the region, and perhaps even to the
democratization of China itself.
Despite implementing extensive democratic reform, President Chiang
Ching-kuo was no democrat at heart. He rolled the dice and carried out
reform largely in an attempt to consolidate his power, in response to the
KMT's increasingly precarious position both at home and especially
abroad. It was no accident that Chiang made his 1986 announcement, not
through the Taiwanese media, but rather through the Washington Post." 0 If
Chiang thought these changes would satisfy the Tang-wai, however, he was
mistaken. Instead of winning the support and adulation of the opposition,
the reforms of the 1980s only "whetted their appetite for even deeper
reform.""1
D. Birth of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (1986)
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) overcame considerable odds
to end fifty years of continuous KMT rule in 2000. Many observers
predicted at its creation in 1986 that the DPP would quickly collapse, as it
faced an immediate threat of factionalism within the party. Furthermore,
most scholars believed that while it may be able to gain power in local
elections, the voters would not risk entrusting the national future to the
radical DPP. 1
2
The Tiananmen massacre on the mainland in 1989 served as a unifying
force for the DPP. In a settlement between elites in the 1991 DPP Party
Congress, the factions agreed to unify around nation-building, a
realignment within the DPP, and most controversially, the canonization of
108 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 129.
109 Id. at 168.
10 Dickson, supra note 14, at 64.
"ll RIGGER, supra note 22, at 131.
112 See Larry Diamond, Anatomy of an Electoral Earthquake: How the KMT Lost and the
DPP Won the 2000 Presidential Election, in TAIWAN'S PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS:
DEMOCRATIZATION AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 48, 50
(Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).
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the Taiwanese independence movement.113 In contrast, the KMT supported
the status-quo, which was the goal of eventual reunification with mainland
China, on equal terms.
The DPP took advantage of the end of martial law to sponsor large-
scale (5,000 or more participants) political rallies and protests. The number
of these protests rose from 175 in 1983, to 335 in 1986, and again to 1,172
in 1988.114 Eventually the DPP realized that its platform of Taiwanese
independence was too controversial to garner mass public support, and the
DPP changed its focus to ending KMT corruption. The DPP's new
platform to end the KMT's "black-gold" politics would eventually bring its
candidate Chen Shui-bian to the presidency in 2000.
E. President Lee Teng-hui Leads Taiwan to National Elections to
Consolidate His Power
Because the U.S. wanted to present Taiwan to the world as a model of
democracy, genuine or not, the U.S. did not openly criticize Taiwan's lack
of national elections for decades. Unlike many Cold War props or what
seems likely to occur in Afghanistan and Iraq today, Taiwan did not have
one landmark election imposed from the outside, but rather a series of new
elections that developed internally and over time. Taiwan's
democratization started with local elections in the 1950s. In 1969 and
1972, the KMT held supplemental elections to fill the seats frozen in the
Legislative Yuan since the implementation of the Temporary Provisions,
vacant only due to death. Taiwan's national offices were finally put in the
hands of the people during the 1990s. The slow development of Taiwan's
electoral system over a half-century, largely free of U.S. demands, allowed
Taiwan to institute democratic reform gradually and on its own terms.
In Taiwan's second national presidential election ever in 2000, the
DPP's Chen Shui-bian defeated the KMT candidate, Lien Chan. By
carrying out a historic and peaceful transition of power, Taiwan passed this
well-known litmus test signifying the consolidation of a nascent democracy.
Chen Shui-bian's presidency has, however, unfortunately been marked by
the DPP's inexperience, and many observers predict the people will vote
him out of office in 2004.115 Nevertheless, a return to KMT rule should not
be seen as a sign of weakness for Taiwan's democracy, but rather of its
13 Tun-jen Cheng & Yung-min Hsu, Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism, and Party
Realignment, in TAIWAN'S ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 137, 149-50
(Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
114 Huang, supra note 19, at 112.
"
5See "Chen Faces Huge Difficulties in his Plan for Re-election," Editorial, THE CHINA
POST, Dec. 25, 2002.
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strength, as the formerly authoritarian KMT will have submitted to the rule
of the ballot box and the people, both in defeat and in victory.'
6
1. Toward national elections
President Chiang Ching-kuo laid the foundation for Taiwan's
democratic reform, permitting the formation of new political parties in
1986. His successor, Lee Teng-hui would push reform to completion,
implementing national elections in the 1990s. Remarkably, Taiwan went
from martial law to full-fledged democracy within only a decade and a half.
a. The death of Chiang Ching-kuo splits the KMT Party
The death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 eventually led to the split of
the KMT party into two coalitions. The "mainstream" coalition formed
around Chiang's Vice-President, Lee Teng-hui, and stood for the
Taiwanization of the party and the acceleration of Taiwan's transition from
dictatorship to representative democracy. The "non-mainstream" coalition
was comprised of mostly conservative mainlanders and the military, and
supported authoritarian rule and the KMT's revised "one-China" policy of
eventual reunification with China.
b. The rise of Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000)
Like Chiang Ching-kuo before him, the uncertainty of Lee Teng-hui's
accession to power proved to be a boon for Taiwan's democratization. As
with Chiang, most observers predicted that Lee would not be able to
consolidate power upon his predecessor's death. 17  Lee defied these
predictions and essentially performed the function of a "political
bulldozer," clearing away all obstacles to the possibility of a peaceful and
democratic transition of power at the end of his rule." 1
8
President Lee used an active platform of reform to gain the support of
the opposition and native Taiwanese, and ward off the advances of the more
conservative elements in the KMT party. Lee also targeted civil society,
116 According to Huntington, one criteria for measuring the consolidation of democratic
rule is the two-turnover test. A second turnover shows that "two major groups of political
leaders in the society are sufficiently committed to democracy to surrender office and power
after losing an election," and that the country is committed to the principle that "when things
go wrong, you change the rulers, not the regime." HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 266-67.
117 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 131.
118 Yun-han Chu, Democratic Consolidation in the Post-KMT Era: The Challenge of
Governance, in TAIWAN'S PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND CROSS-STRAIT
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 88, 99 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).
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including local factions and business groups, for sources of support.119 In
1991, Lee called for the end of the Temporary Provisions that had
suspended much of the Constitution since 1948. Symbolically, in March
1995, Lee ended decades of KMT censorship and apologized on behalf of
the KMT for the 2-28 Massacre of 1947.120 Furthermore, President Lee
started the process of democratizing the political processes within the KMT
itself, unlike his 2predecessors who did not permit any challenges from
within the party.
Significantly, under Lee, the KMT developed a new, more
sophisticated policy toward the mainland. It declared Taiwan a "separate
political entity," but without forsaking the theme of eventual
reunification.' 2  The KMT, however, would only push for reunification if
and when "the PRC abides by Sun Yat-sen's [democratic] principles."'123
This clever policy caught Communist China in a political bind in the
international community, and gained the support of the majority of the
native Taiwanese. 124 Unfortunately for the KMT, this and other reforms
also led to its division, and the non-mainstream coalition split off to form
the New Party in 1993.125
President Lee also reorganized Taiwan's foreign policy, establishing a
policy of "pragmatic" or "flexible" diplomacy. Lee implemented a
"checkbook" diplomacy by which Taiwan essentially bought the
recognition of several small third-world nations. Lee also reversed
Taiwan's self-imposed isolation from international organizations. Under
Lee, Taiwan no longer insisted that only one China could be represented in
international organizations. 127 In 1990, Taiwan applied to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and in summer 1993 it appealed
for a return to the UN.' 28 Later in 2001, Taiwan, along with mainland
China, would join the World Trade Organization (WTO).
119 Shiau, supra note 30, at 111.
120 COPPER, supra note 11, at 63; See MOODY, JR., supra note 81, at 42-43.
121 Huang, supra note 19, at 121-22.
122 Scalapino, supra note 21, at xiv.
123 Id.
124 Shiau, supra note 30, at 111.
125See Qingguo Jia, Beijing and Taipei: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, in TAIWAN'S
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 193, 195 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).
126 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 154-55.
121 Id. at 155.
128 Shiau, supra note 30, at 111.
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c. The 1990 National Affairs Conference sets the agenda for
democratic reform
In mid-1990, President Lee honored a campaign pledge and convened
a National Affairs Conference (NAC), designated to develop a consensus
on constitutional reform. Lee created this "extra-constitutional institution"
to "negotiate the conditions of a post-authoritarian state."
129
Under Lee's direction, the NAC called for the election of a new
National Assembly, the revision of the Constitution, and the abolishment of
the Temporary Provisions. 130 It recommended elections for the Provincial
Governor and the Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, starting in 1994. The
NAC demanded the retirement of the senior parliamentarians, who would
step down in 1991. Furthermore, it called for a popular election for the
National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and possibly even the President,
which would happen in 1991, 1992, and 1996 respectively.
d. The nominal roles of the National Assembly and Legislative
Yuan.
Although the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan passed a lot of
constitutional amendments and legislation implementing democratic reform
in the 1990s, they did so only under the direction of President Lee Teng-
hui. Throughout their histories, these national bodies have been filled with
mobsters, the beneficiaries of the corrupt vote-buying system of the KMT.
They are better known nationally and internationally as "pugilist dens,"
because of the frequent brawls that break out between politicians while in
session. 31  Nevertheless, the U.S. maintained its public admiration of
Taiwanese democracy for decades.
The National Assembly would pass six sets of amendments to the
Constitution in the 1990s, carrying out the mandate of President Lee and his
National Affairs Conference (NAC). Most significantly, in May 1991, the
First National Assembly repealed the Temporary Provisions by passing ten
amendments to the Constitution. In May 1992 and July 1994, the Second
National Assembly passed eight more amendments to the Constitution,
providing for elections for the President, the Vice-President, the Provincial
Governor, and the Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. 132 The Legislative
Yuan subsequently promulgated the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
129 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 151-52.
130 JOHN F. COPPER, As TAIWAN APPROACHES THE NEW MILLENIUM: ESSAYS ON POLMCS
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 68 (1999).
131 Tozzi, supra note 18, at 1245.
132 COPPER, supra note 11, at 98.
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Election and Recall Law in August 1995, governing candidacy and
campaign rules.
1 33
Neither the Legislative Yuan nor the National Assembly can be
viewed, however, as leaders in Taiwan's democratization. How President
Lee convinced them not to vehemently block his reforms is unclear and an
important subject for future study. Perhaps Lee simply bought their support
by allowing legislators to continue abusing their powers, as evident in his
tacit acceptance of their self-serving vote to extend their own terms by two
years in September 1999.134 Or perhaps these KMT-dominated bodies
simply never envisioned the possibility of ever actually being voted out.
They only circled the wagons after Chen Shui-bian's victory in 2000, when
they started their unabashed obstruction of any and all DPP initiatives.
135
2. National elections and the breakdown of KMT Party discipline
(1991-1996)
The late 1980s and early 1990s in Taiwan saw the implementation of
national elections for the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, Provincial
Governor, and Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. They also saw both the
explosion of money politics in Taiwan and a popular backlash against it.
KMT support had previously guaranteed victory for its candidates, but this
became less and less the case. Younger KMT members increasingly
resisted party discipline and ran as independents after being denied official
nomination by the party.136 As individual voters grew more inclined to vote
for individual candidates based not on the KMT's preferences but their
own, 137 the KMT felt more and more compelled to pay off factions and the
mafia, until the cycle broke in 2000.
a. The 1991 National Assembly elections cause the DPP to
change its platform
In 1991, the Taiwanese people elected for the first time the
representatives to the National Assembly, the body empowered to amend
133 Id.
134 For an account of this "self-fattening soap opera," see RIGGER, supra note 90, at 112-
16; Chu, supra note 118, at 90.
135 "[President] Chen could well cite the KMT's obstacles to political reform in order to
make a strong case to the Taiwan people for a DPP-controlled Legislative Yuan." Muthiah
Alagappa, Introduction: Presidential Election, Democratization, and Cross-Strait Relations,
TAIWAN'S PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 18 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).
136 Dickson, supra note 14, at 60.
137 Id.
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the Constitution, and before 1996, to elect the President and Vice-President.
They, however, chose not to vote out the ruling KMT party. The DPP had
been growing since its inception in 1986, but the KMT won in a landslide,
gaining 67.7% of the popular vote.' 38 This caused the DPP to shift its party
platform to the end of KMT "black-gold" politics. This move to the center
would prove key for the DPP, as the Taiwanese people had looked upon its
previous platform of Taiwanese independence as synonymous with an
unwanted war with mainland China. Due in large part to the DPP's new
platform, the 1991 elections would be the last in which the KMT
successfully used money politics to control the local factions. 139
b. The 1992 Legislative Yuan elections finalize the KMT split
The 1992 elections were the first in which the Taiwanese people
elected the members of the Legislative Yuan. These elections finalized the
split in the ruling KMT party. The KMT still won handily, but the DPP
gained ground with its new campaign strategy, with attention paid to fair
taxes, the environment, social welfare, housing, and improvements in
public transportation. 40 Internal tensions within the KMT exploded, as Lee
Teng-hui forced out his Premier, the military's Hau Pei-tsun, in 1993, and
the conservative non-mainstream coalition broke off to form the New Party
(NP).
c. The 1994 elections give rise to future national leaders
In the 1994 elections, the Taiwanese people elected the Provincial
Governor'14 for the first time ever, and the Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung
for the first time since 1964 and 1977 respectively. 42 These elections were
the first three-party elections in Taiwan's history, between the KMT, the
newly formed New Party (NP), and the DPP. 43
The 1994 elections marked the ascension to national prominence of
two significant players in the upcoming landmark 2000 Presidential
138 Jirgen Domes, Electoral and Party Politics in Democratization, DEMOCRATIZATION IN
TAIWAN 49, 53 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., 1999).
139 See Ming-tong Chen, Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan's Democratization,
TAIWAN'S ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 174, 191 (Hung-Mao Tien
ed., 1996).
140 Domes, supra note 138, at 55.
141 The artifact from the original KMT governmental structure brought over from the
mainland designated to rule the "province" of Taiwan while the president was designated to
rule over all of China. See supra Part III.B.3.
142 COPPER, supra note 11, at 2.
143 Id. at 2-3.
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Election. The Provincial Governorship was won in a landslide by the
KMT's James Soong, whose squabbles with President Lee Teng-hui would
later cause yet another split within the KMT party. Meanwhile, the DPP
scored its first major electoral victory, carrying the Taipei mayoral election
with its candidate, the future President Chen Shui-bian.
3. On to direct presidential elections
The KMT would hold onto power in the first Presidential Election in
Taiwan's history, called for and won by President Lee Teng-hui in 1996.
Largely due to a split in the KMT party, however, the DPP's candidate
Chen Shui-bian would emerge victorious in the 2000 Presidential Election.
a. Lee calls for and wins Taiwan's first Presidential Election
(1996)
Lee Teng-hui, president since Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988,
called for and won Taiwan's inaugural presidential election in 1996. The
election itself, plus Lee's increasingly public leanings toward Taiwanese
independence, caused a great uproar in Communist China, and led to
China's foray into what has been dubbed "missile diplomacy." The PRC
campaigned against President Lee by launching two missiles over Taiwan,
as a warning for the Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, on March 23, 1996,
after the U.S. had sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to patrol the Taiwan
Strait, 74% of Taiwanese voters defied the PRC. 144 The people re-elected
President Lee Teng-hui, making him the first democratically elected
president in Chinese history.
The international community praised President Lee, even nominating
him for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.145 Lee, however, would later fall
out of favor in the KMT, as distraught KMT supporters would blame him
for its failure in the historic 2000 Presidential Election. 46
b. The 2000 Presidential Election: the first democratic
transition of power in China's 5,000 year history
Chen Shui-bian's historic victory in the 2000 Presidential Election was
hailed world-wide as the first democratic transition of power in China's
144 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 175-176.
145 COPPER, supra note 11, at 108.
146 The day after the 2000 Presidential Election, KMT demonstrators protested outside
KMT headquarters for five days and demanded Lee Teng-hui's resignation as KMT chair;
RIGGER, supra note 90, at 198.
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5,000 year history. This DPP victory was, however, due more to internal
division within the KMT than to any increase in popular support for the
DPP. President Chen was extremely fortunate to win with only 39% of the
popular vote, 147 and many observers predict he will lose the upcoming 2004
Presidential Election.
4. Another KMT split opens the door for the DPP
Instead of designating James Soong as his successor, President Lee
chose the unpopular Lien Chan. Soong should have been the logical choice
for the KMT's presidential candidate in 2000, as he had won the national
election for Provincial Governor in 1994, and was probably the most
popular political figure in Taiwan. Soong would have his revenge for this
slight, as he broke from party discipline and declared himself an
independent candidate. This effectively split the KMT vote, and opened the
door for Chen Shui-bian's victory in 2000.
For a variety of reasons, "stopping Soong's ascent [became] one of the
overriding political missions of Lee Teng-hui.' 48 Among those publicly
known are Soong's leanings toward the non-mainstream coalition, as Soong
was a mainlander who favored the eventual reunification with China. As
Provincial Governor, Soong had also publicly objected to a series of
unfunded mandates and programs imposed upon his provincial
government.149  He then resisted Lee's dismantling of this redundant
provincial government in 1998.50
Soong was the early frontrunner in the 2000 Presidential Race, but
President Lee slowed his assent by accusing him of misappropriating KMT
party money. This both weakened Soong and boosted the DPP and its anti-
KMT corruption platform. During the final weeks of the campaign, Lee
Teng-hui "spent most of his political energy and rhetorical fire attacking
Soong rather than Chen Shui-bian."' 15 1 Lee's actions during the 2000
campaign have given rise to speculation to this day that he had secretly
supported the DPP's Chen Shui-bian from the start.
147 Independent candidate James Soong just lost with 37% of the vote. KMT candidate
Lien Chan finished a distant third with 23%. DIAMOND, supra note 112, at 49.
148 Diamond, supra note 112, at 56.
149 Id.
150 RIGGER, supra note 90, at 179.
151 Diamond, supra note 112, at 57.
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5. Chen Shui-bian's DPP stumbles to victory
To the shock of the world, the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian
emerged victorious in the 2000 Presidential Election. Chen successfully
directed public attention toward the DPP's new platform of democratization
and the end of the KMT's "black gold" politics, diverting attention from the
issue of Taiwanese independence that threatened his DPP party the most.
152
Chen, however, was the beneficiary of a unique set of domestic and
international circumstances that pushed him to victory, and with only 39%
of the vote, a minority one at that.
The 2000 Presidential Election was preceded by two symbols of
blatant KMT corruption around which the DPP mobilized. In September
1999, the National Assembly amended the Constitution to extend the terms
of its own members by more than 2 years. During this same month, Taiwan
suffered its largest earthquake in a century, which left over 2,000 people
dead and damages estimated at 10% of Taiwan's 1999 GDP.153 There was
much public outcry over widespread reports of KMT officials stealing
earthquake relief funds.
54
A few weeks before the election, mainland China provided its
obligatory threats toward Taiwan. President Lee Teng-hui had offhandedly
described cross-strait relations as a "special state-to-state relationship"
during a July 1999 interview with a German radio network.1 55 In an
attempt to nip any "Taiwanese independence" policy movement in the bud,
PRC Premier Zhu Rong-ji warned the Taiwanese people that a vote for the
DPP, the party traditionally associated with the "two-Chinas" policy, and its
candidate Chen Shui-bian would be a vote for a PRC invasion of Taiwan.'
56
Like in 1996, this apparently backfired, only boosting Chen's image in the
eyes of a defiant Taiwanese public.' 57 Chen Shui-bian won with 39% of the
vote, defeating the independent candidate James Soong by only two
percentage points. The KMT candidate Lien Chan finished a dismal third,
with only 23% of the vote.
Despite the DPP's historic victory in 2000, many scholars believe that
the party has come to power before its time. 1 58 Chen's victory by no means
provided him with a strong mandate. Chen is a "triple minority" president,
as he was elected with a minority of the popular vote, the DPP is a minority
152 Cf Diamond, supra note 112, at 68 (discussing Chen's historic support of
democratization).
153 Edmonds, supra note 74, at 14.
154 Id. at 16.
155 RIGGER, supra note 90, at 180-181.
156 Diamond, supra note 112, at 74.
157 Id.
158 Chu, supra note 118, at 89.
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in the Legislative Yuan, and his own faction is a minority force within the
DPP itself.159 Chen's unwillingness to understand the weakness of his
position has led him through a series of political blunders upon rising to
power, that have been worsened by poor provisions in the Constitution for
the breaking of deadlocks between the President and the Legislative
Yuan. 16° Both President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu have faced
the threat of impeachment since taking office, and many predict that Chen
will become a one-term president after the next election in 2004.
A return to KMT rule, however, would not be a sign of failure for
democracy in Taiwan, but rather of its triumph. If this happens, the former
authoritarian ruling party, the KMT, will have peacefully stepped down
after losing the 2000 election, and regained its position through the ballot
box, not through the sword.
IV Internal factors far outweighed U.S. influence in producing Taiwan's
democratic miracle
The U.S. government will be tempted to hold Taiwan up as vindication
for its Cold War policies, and look to its role in Taiwan as a paradigm for
U.S. promotion of democratization in the future. The proper lesson for the
U.S. from the Taiwan example, however, should be one of humility, not
inspiration. U.S. economic aid and military protection were in fact
instrumental to Taiwan's survival in the face of the constant threat of
Communist China, and also laid the foundation for Taiwan's economic
miracle. Taiwan's successful democratization, however, resulted not from
U.S. efforts, but in spite of them. 16  Taiwan's policies of economic
protectionism and authoritarian rule that led to its successful
democratization in the 1980s and '90s are virtually the opposite of those
imposed by the U.S. on developing democracies during the Cold War and
today. Moreover, the U.S.' betrayal of Taiwan in the 1970s sparked a
decade of crisis in Taiwan that would have most certainly given rise to a
negative backlash against the U.S. and its ideals, but for internal factors
unique to Taiwan. In short, the U.S. lucked out.
159 Id. at 105.
160 Alagappa, supra note 135, at 9-10.
161 Harvey J. Feldman said during a conference on Taiwan Constitutional Reform: "It was
clear to me as a practitioner of policy in the State Department that the United States for long
years had no Taiwan policy at all. Policy toward the Republic of China was simply an
adjunct of our policy toward mainland China." CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE FUTURE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (Harvey J. Feldman, ed., 1991).
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A. Internal Factors Not Subject to U.S. Influence
Before drawing any lessons from the Taiwan example, the U.S. must
recognize that several internal factors, beyond U.S. influence, gave Taiwan
a significant head start over most developing democracies. There was a
historical philosophical legitimacy for democracy in Taiwan through the
teachings of its spiritual father Sun Yat-sen. Taiwan is an island nation,
providing it a built-in security not enjoyed by continental countries.
Moreover, the authoritarian mandate of the KMT government was
constrained by its embarrassing flight from mainland China, its declining
international status, and its status as a minority immigrant ruler of Taiwan.
Furthermore, Taiwan was blessed with two powerful leaders who both had
not only the goal of consolidating power through democratic reform, but
also the ability to outmaneuver the dominant conservative faction of the
KMT. Finally, Taiwan played an extremely sympathetic victim in the Cold
War fight against the Communist menace of China, providing it for a time
with unmatched international support.
1. Philosophical legitimacy for democracy
Despite the circularity of the logic, it is certainly beneficial for an
incipient democracy to be able to call upon a historical philosophy that
itself calls for, or is compatible with, democracy. Unlike most non-Western
countries, 162 Taiwan had this advantage in the teachings of Sun Yat-sen,
and even in many aspects of the teachings of Confucius.
a. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles call for democracy
Democratic ideals in Taiwan did not have to be created from scratch as
Taiwan's political philosophy was based on its spiritual leader Dr. Sun Yat-
sen and his Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and
social welfare. Before ending several millennia of dynastic rule in China in
1912, Dr. Sun had lived for a time in the U.S. and revered the writings of
Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln. 163 He died in 1925.
The KMT followed its creator Dr. Sun's lead and created a
constitution in late 1946, three years before it fled the mainland. The KMT
modeled the Taiwanese constitution after the U.S. Constitution,' 64 calling
162 This notably includes all Muslim countries, which are "much less democratic than their
levels of economic development would predict." Christopher Clague ET AL., Determinants
of Lasting Democracy in Poor Countries: Culture, Development, and Institutions, 573
ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 36 (2001).
163 COPPER, supra note 11, at 10.
'64Id. at 9.
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for a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people."' 165 It
was designed to carry out Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, which put
"electoral competition at the heart of the KMT's mission as a party."' 66 The
KMT not only supported this notion, but based its legitimacy in part on its
outstanding performances in Taiwan's early elections.
67
The R.O.C. Constitution sets up a system of checks and balances
between five branches: The Executive, 168 Legislative,
169 Control, 170
Examination,171 and Judicial Yuans.172 The office of the President straddles
all five branches, and is distinct from the Executive Yuan. The President in
theory can only promulgate laws and issue mandates with the
countersignature of the Premier, the head of the Executive Yuan. 73 The
President appoints the Premier, however, and thus in reality dominates the
Taiwanese political system.174 Under the original Constitution, the National
Assembly, not the people, elects the President and Vice-President.7 7 The
National Assembly also has the power to amend the Constitution. 1
76
b. Confucianism is compatible with democracy
Although Confucian values may have provided for a political stability
that delayed the transition to democracy in Taiwan, 177 there are aspects of
165 ROC Const ch. I., art. 1; COPPER, supra note 11, at 10.
166 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 65.
1671d. at 19.
168 The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of the state, ROC Const. ch. V,
art. 53
169 "The Legislative Yuan shall be the highest legislative organ of the State, to be
constituted of members elected by the people. It shall exercise legislative power on behalf
of the people." ROC Const. ch. VI, art. 62.
170 The Control Yuan is a general oversight branch for the other governmental branches,
both on the central and local level. ROC Const. ch. IX.
171 "The Examination Yuan shall be the highest examination organ of the State and shall
have charge of matters relating to examination, employment, registration, service rating,
scale of salaries, promotion and transfer, security of tenure, commendation, pecuniary aid in
case of death, retirement and old age pension." ROC Const. ch. VIII, art. 83.
172 ROC Const. ch. VII.
173 ROC Const. ch. IV, art. 37.
174 "One writer has even asserted that the constitutional power conferred on the president
was 'rarely conferred on any head of state in the world."' COPPER, supra note 11, at 95-6.
175 ROC Const. ch. III., art. 27.
176 Id.
177 William L Parish & Charles Chi-hsiang Chang, Political Values in Taiwan: Sources of
Change and Constancy, in TAIWAN'S ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
27-28 (Hung-Mao Tien ed., 1996).
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Confucianism that are not only compatible with democracy, but in fact
foster it. According to the popular but erroneous "Lee Thesis," Chinese
politics are destined to remain the same because Chinese or Asian values
are incompatible with democracy.' 78 Taiwan's successful democratization
puts to rest the essentialist form of this argument.
Often lost in the debate over the "Lee Thesis" is the fact that
Confucian deference to authority is predicated on a benevolent
authoritarianism. In classical Chinese thought "an emperor legitimately
wielding the 'Mandate of Heaven' ruled for the benefit of the people; if he
ceased to place their welfare paramount, popular revolt was justified. 1 79
Francis Fukuyama points out that "Chinese Confucianism, in particular,
does not legitimate deference to the authority of an all-powerful state that
leaves no scope for the development of an independent civil society."' 8
Confucianism may not require democratic institutions, but once Sun Yat-
sen made a written constitution the embodiment of his Three Principles of
the People, the Confucian emphasis on propriety meant that the KMT party
state had to uphold it.'
81
Furthermore, Confucianism's tolerance for religions, competitive state
examination system for bureaucratic positions, and in particular, its focus
on education, are all conducive for democratic rule.' 82 "Taiwan may be
unique in the world in expecting its ministers to hold doctorates," and many
of these doctorates are obtained from U.S. universities.' 83 From Japan's
past efforts to make Taiwan its model colony, the KMT government had
inherited a population that by 1942 was 58% literate (though in Japanese),
and in which three-quarters of school-aged children were in school. 184 The
KMT built upon this advantage, making public expenditure on education
second only to defense, representing 8.6% of government expenditures in
1950, 16.6% in 1987, and an astounding 19.1% in 1994. 85 Although the
KMT's emphasis on education was in part to reprogram the local
Taiwanese, and to discourage the Taiwanese dialect in favor of its official
178 Named after the president of Singapore Lee Kuan-Yew. Singaporean authorities had
just sentenced Michael Fay, an American teenager caught spraying graffiti in Singapore in
1993, to a caning. Lee Kuan Yew famously responded to U.S. protests by drawing
distinctions between Western and Eastern cultures, and arguing that U.S. values were
incompatible with Asian societies. Francis Fukuyama, Confucianism and Democracy, in
GLOBAL DIVERGENCE OF DEMOCRACIES 23 (Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner eds., 2001).
179 Tozzi, supra note 18, at 1194.
180 Fukuyama, supra note 178, at 31.
181 See Tsang, supra note 16, at 7.
182 Fukuyama, supra note 178, at 28.
183 Laurence Whitehead, The Democratization of Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective, in
DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN 168, 171 (Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., 1999).
184 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 67.
185 Tsang, supra note 16, at 10-11.
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language, Mandarin Chinese, 186 the end result was the widespread literacy
prerequisite to the development of a civil society and democracy.1
87
2. The protection of the Taiwan Strait
Given their built-in security from invasion, islands like Taiwan have
an advantage over most developing democracies.' 88 Great Britain, the first
major democracy, benefited from this same effect. Although not an island,
the U.S. did as well.
The Taiwan Strait separating Taiwan from China, combined with the
protection of the U.S. and a mainland Chinese army exhausted by decades
of war, has given Taiwan a relative security in the last half of the 20th
century. This peace contributed not only to the development of Taiwanese
civil society, but also to the maintenance of U.S. popular support for
Taiwan. In contrast, war-tom Vietnam did not enjoy either of these
benefits.
3. The KMT's inhibited political center
Taiwan had from its inception something that most developing
countries have lacked - a government, in the KMT, that felt the need to
exert considerable self-restraint in the exercise of its power.' 89 Steve Tsang
identifies such an "inhibited political center" as the most important long-
term factor that makes democratization possible. 190 The KMT's "mandate
of heaven" or basis for governmental legitimacy was continually on shaky
ground, given the KMT's embarrassing flight from mainland China, loss of
its United Nations seat, and derecognition by the U.S. KMT leaders were
"deeply cognizant of past failure," and determined to learn from them and
adapt.19'
186 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 72; See MOODY, JR., supra note 81, at 57.
187 "As stated by [Robert] Putnam, whether democracy works or not depends on the
crossover of memberships in voluntary associations, or in other words, affluent social
capital." Dung-Sheng Chen, Taiwan's Social Changes in the Patterns of Solidarity in the
201P Century, in TAIWAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 61, 62
(Richard Louis Edmonds & Steven M. Goldstein eds., 2001); "By 1984, the total number of
nation-wide and provincial voluntary associations was about 5,200, becoming 6,100 by 1988
and about 12,000 by 1996." Id. at 71.
188See Clague, supra note 162, at 16-17.
189 See Tsang, supra note 16, at 7.
190 Id.
191 Scalapino, supra note 21, at ix.
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4. Immigrant minority rulers must appease the majority
Although the KMT first sought to suppress all dissent, as symbolized
by the 2-28 Massacre in 1947, it was highly aware of its minority status and
the need to reestablish its legitimacy with the native Taiwanese.,92 When
Chiang Kai-shek fled the mainland to take over Taiwan in 1949, the KMT
represented only 0.8% of the Taiwanese population.1 93  The native
Taiwanese majority would become a significant source of dissent. 1 94
The KMT instituted local elections in the 1950s not only to regain U.S.
support, but also as the first of many systematic attempts to rein in dissent
by recruiting native Taiwanese into the party. In the 1970s, Chiang Ching-
kuo implemented his indigenization or "Taiwanization" policy. Lee Teng-
hui, a beneficiary of this policy, later established national elections in the
1990s, once again to appease the native Taiwanese opposition. Parallel
developments can be found in the British colonial experience, as Britain
initially designed democratic institutions for its own exclusive use, but over
time had no choice but to allow the native majority to participate in them
and soon dominate.
5. Two leaders who skillfully carried out democratic reform to
consolidate power
As Huntington points out, "[e]conomic development makes democracy
possible; political leadership makes it real."' 95  In many countries,
successful democratic reform has depended on the strength of a
"democratizer."'' 96 Taiwan has been blessed with two - President Chiang
Ching-kuo (1978-1988) and President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000). They
both faced considerable opposition in their accessions to the presidency,
and needed great political savvy to consolidate their power. They both
accomplished this by pushing for democratic reform, thus outmaneuvering
the dominant conservative faction of the KMT and garnering popular and
international support. Even though they carried out reform for more self-
interested purposes than befits the model of the benevolent dictator, the fact
is they both brought Taiwan closer to a true democracy. As Robert
Scalapino writes, "Not all societies have been so fortunate." 197
192 See Tsang , supra note 16, at 9.
193 Huang, supra note 19, at 114.
194 Huang, supra note 19, at 113.
195 HUNTMGTON, supra note 8, at 316.
196 
id.197 Scalapino, supra note 2 1, at xi.
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When President Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, there was a long battle
over succession. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo finally emerged victorious
three years later, having overcome the KMT conservatives and the
predictions of many observers. Chiang Ching-kuo pushed for
democratization, not for the people themselves, but rather for their support.
As part of his "Taiwanization policy," he surprisingly named Lee Teng-hui
Vice-President in 1982, the first native Taiwanese to be named to an
important KMT post. When the Tang-wai opposition illegally formed the
DPP party in 1986, Chiang chose not to suppress it, defying the KMT
conservatives. Chiang lifted martial law the very next year.
President Lee Teng-hui was equally instrumental in Taiwan's
transition to democracy, defeating the conservative "non-mainstream"
coalition within the KMT, and effectively forcing it to split off to form the
New Party in 1993. Lee essentially performed the function of a "political
bulldozer," removing all obstacles to the possibility of a peaceful and
democratic transition of power at the end of his rule.198 To overcome the
KMT conservatives, Lee directed his energies toward gaining popular
support, and pushed through national elections for the Legislative Yuan, the
Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the Provincial Governor of Taiwan, and
finally the Presidency itself. Due to Lee's ruthlessness and skill, he
ultimately stripped almost all his political archrivals of all P9ower, allowing
him to push through his reform program almost unopposed.
6. Taiwan's international role as alternative to Communist China
Taiwan provided an alternative to Communist China whose clarity was
unmatched by any other Cold War prop, allowing the U.S. to garner strong
domestic and international support for Taiwan. It has enjoyed over fifty
years of peace, both resulting from and contributing to this U.S. support.
Given its military and political dependence on the U.S., it was in Taiwan's
best interests to adopt democratic reform. Although the U.S. and the
Western world started to turn its back on Taiwan when it began transferring
diplomatic recognition from the KMT to the PRC in the 1970s, this shift
also pushed Taiwan into an even more sympathetic light, particularly in the
eyes of the anti-Communist U.S. Congress. Encouraged by such calls
supporting Taiwan, all three of its presidents, Chiang Kai-shek and in
particular Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, implemented democratic
reform, in large part to consolidate or regain U.S. support.
198 Chu, supra note 118, at 99.
199 See Kuo, supra note 44, at 93.
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B. The U.S.' Intentional Contributions: Military and Economic
Aid
The U.S. provided military and economic assistance that was
instrumental to Taiwan's economic and democratic development. Without
such aid, Taiwan would have succumbed to mainland China long ago. It is
unclear, however, what principles the U.S. should apply in deciding when
to extend such aid to incipient democracies. What is clear is that the
policies the U.S. applied in practice toward Taiwan in the 1950s and '60s
were completely different from its present-day foreign policies demanding
near-term economic liberalization and commitments to national elections as
prerequisites to U.S. aid.
1. Military protection form China
The U.S. has offered Taiwan a level of security from foreign invasion
that few countries have enjoyed,200 allowing Taiwanese civil society and
democracy to develop over time. Unlike its economic aid, the U.S.
protection of Taiwan has been constant. With the outbreak of the Korean
War, the U.S. renewed its support of the KMT, making its security
commitment official with the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954.
At this treaty's expiration, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA) of 1979, providing for the continued U.S. military protection of202
Taiwan against mainland China. When the PRC lofted missiles near
Taiwan's two largest ports to influence Taiwan's landmark 1996
Presidential Election, the U.S. sent in two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan
Strait to maintain peace.
2. U.S. economic aid sparks "the Taiwan miracle"
In direct contrast to recent U.S. policy which ties foreign economic aid
to progress in democratization and economic liberalization, Taiwan was for
a time the largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, in spite of its
authoritarian rule and protectionist economic policies 203 The U.S.
investment in Taiwan, mostly in its agriculture and infrastructure,
comprised of 31% of all U.S. foreign investment from 1951-1963,20
200 COPPER, supra note 11, at 9.
201 Chu & Lin, supra note 31, at 113.
202 Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 13 Stat. 14 §3(a) (1979). See Goldstein &
Schriver, supra note 56, at 150.
203 COPPER, supra note 11, at 26.
204 Christopher Howe, Taiwan in the 20th Century: Model or Victim? Development
Problems in a Small Asian Economy, in TAIWAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTuRY: A
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totaling $1.5 billion by 1965.205 Under the direction of mostly Western-
educated Taiwanese engineers and economists,2 °6 Taiwan implemented land
reform policies that resulted not only in a rapid increase in overall
production, but also equalized the distribution of wealth.2 °7 U.S. assistance
laid the foundation for Taiwan's economic miracle in the 1960s and '70s.
Taiwan's booming economy, in turn, greatly facilitated Taiwan's rapid
democratization in the 1980s and '90s. By the 1980s, Taiwan had
developed the high levels of urbanization, industrialization, literacy rates,
mass communication, and rising per capita income that scholars generally
agree are conducive for democratization.2 °8  Taiwan's economic
development led to a growing middle class that fed the opposition's push
for reform. A business community formed and developed considerable
sway over elections, with not only the resources to support the prohibitively
expensive campaigns of the 1980s and '90s, but also the influence over the
votes of legions of employees.20 9 The support of the business community
was crucial to both Lee Teng-hui's accession to power in the late 1980S,
and Chen Shui-bian's historic presidential victory in 2000.211
C. The U.S.' Inherent Contribution: Democracy's Natural Appeal
to Oppositions
From a long-term perspective, the greatest contribution the U.S. could
make to worldwide democratization may well be to simply lead by
example. This is not necessarily because democracy is the best form of
government, but rather because it is inherently attractive to any opposition
movement toiling under an authoritarian regime. Oppositions, such as Sun
Yat-sen's Revolutionary Alliance against the Qing Dynasty, the KMT
against mainland China, and the Tang-wai movement against the KMT,
have an automatic incentive to call for popular elections and a free press, at
least until they rise to power. As John Fuh-sheng Hsieh points out,
RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 37, 50-51 (Richard Louis Edmonds & Steven M. Goldstein eds.,
2001).
205 COPPER, supra note 24, at 172.
206 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 69.
207 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 71.
208 WACHMAN, supra note 27, at 221.
209 Chyuan-Jenq Shiau, Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship, in
TAIWAN'S ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 213, 220 (Hung-Mao Tien
ed., 1996).
210 ld. at 223.
211 See Generally, Diamond, supra note 112, at 72.
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"[D]emocratization can be seen as a bargaining process between the
government and the opposition.,
212
Perhaps the best way for the U.S. to take advantage of the inherent
appeal of democracy is to encourage foreigners to study in the U.S.
American universities have been filled with a disproportionate number of
students from Taiwan for decades. It is not a coincidence that Taiwan's
successful democratization was led spiritually by Sun Yat-sen, who had
lived for a time in the U.S., and pushed to completion by Lee Teng-hui,
who had received a doctorate from Cornell University in 1968. To best
achieve world-wide democratization, the U.S. government should keep the
goal of encouraging foreign students to study in the U.S. in mind while
fighting its War on Terror that has the inherent danger of driving foreign
students away.
D. The U.S.' Betrayal of Taiwan Unwittingly Spurred Democratic
Reform
Calls for democracy often grow loudest in the midst of crises such as
Taiwan's dark decade of the 1970s, much as they would two decades later
with the earthquake that devastated central Taiwan the year before its
historic transition of power in the 2000 Presidential Election. In pursuing
its self-interests in the 1970s, the U.S. caused major upheaval in its former
prince, Taiwan. Despite the U.S.' betrayal of Taiwan, a unique
combination of factors surprisingly pushed Taiwan even closer toward
democracy.
1. The U.S. transfer of recognition from the KMT to the PRC as the
rightful leader of China
After over two decades of U.S. support, President Nixon's historic
visit to China in 1972 and the U.S.' subsequent recognition of the PRC in
1979 effectively pulled out the rug from under Taiwan. The U.S. the
actions of the U.S. were not based on any indiscretions on the part of
Taiwan and certainly not on any indications of democratization in China,
but rather on a unique opportunity to develop relations with a future world
power.
Nonetheless, instead of causing a negative backlash, the U.S. betrayal
only spurred the KMT to push for democratic reform. Taiwan still
depended on U.S. protection from the ever-present threat of invasion from
the mainland, and also faced diplomatic isolation and internal revolt. Only
212 John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh, East Asian Culture and Democratic Transition, With Special
Reference to the Case of Taiwan, in TAIWAN IN PERSPECTIVE 29, 35 (Wei-Chin Lee, ed.,
2000).
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by "seizing the moral high ground of democratic legitimacy" could Taiwan
regain the domestic and international support necessary to fend off
China.213 Chiang Kai-shek held the 1972 supplemental elections to the
Legislative Yuan in part in response to Nixon's visit to China.214 The U.S.
derecognition of Taiwan in 1979 created domestic turmoil that sparked the
wave of political liberalization in Taiwan in the 1980s and '90s.
2. The U.S. forces the devaluation of Taiwan's currency
U.S. economic policy toward Taiwan has been anything but consistent.
In the 1950s and '60s, the U.S. played a crucial advisory and financial role
in helping Taiwan implement its land reform and industrialization policies.
Taiwan's rapid economic expansion, however, was built in part on its
extremely favorable trade balance with the U.S. since the 1970s.2 15 This
eventually led to a protectionist reaction in the U.S.,216 culminating in 1984
when the U.S. replaced its policy of "free trade" with one of "fair trade.,
217
The U.S. forced Taiwan to remove barriers to trade, demanded the
improvement of Taiwanese working conditions, and caused an upward
revaluation of the Taiwanese dollar by more than 50% between 1986 and
1989.218
The argument can of course be made that such economic liberalization
was in the best long-term interests of Taiwan and any developing
democracy itself. The lesson learned from Taiwan's economic miracle,
however, was that such forced liberalization was only imposed on Taiwan
only after it became an economic power, and not as a precondition to U.S.
aid from the start.
Despite U.S. economic aggression, any retaliatory impulses of the
KMT were constrained by the looming threat of international isolation and
an increasingly powerful Communist China. In response to these dark
times, the Tang-wai opposition took the risk of illegally forming the DPP
party in 1986. President Chiang Ching-kuo then made the historic decision
to withhold his authoritarian impulses and end martial law, in a desperate
attempt to regain U.S. support and appease the masses.
213 Whitehead, supra note 183, at 178.
214 COPPER, supra note 11, at 27.
215 Shiau, supra note 209, at 219.
216 Shiau, supra note 30, at 107.
217 1d.
218 Shiau, supra note 209, at 219.
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E. The U.S.' Accidental Contribution: The Pygmalion Effect
Of Taiwan's many advantages over most nascent democracies, one
often unnoticed is how the U.S. overlooked Taiwan's many undemocratic
indiscretions during its promotion of Taiwan as "Free China" throughout
the Cold War. It is interesting to speculate as to what degree the KMT
and/or the Tang-wai opposition rose to the level of these democratic
expectations, as per the Pygmalion effect. At the very least, the rose-
colored glasses worn by the U.S. allowed Taiwanese democracy more room
to develop internally and at its own pace.
The KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek and his successors was
in reality anything but democratic. It imposed martial law and ran a
protectionist economy for decades, and did not implement national
elections until the 1990s. Nevertheless, American politicians and citizens
maintained a fascination with and admiration of Chiang Kai-shek and his
wife, continuing from when Time Magazine proclaimed them "Man and
Wife of the Year" in 1937.219
While certainly not a sufficient condition for democratization, the
Pygmalion effect can play a significant role. The U.S.' idealization of
Taiwan fostered the expectations of the Taiwanese opposition. The Tang-
wai opposition and later the DPP could point to the disparities between the
KMT's image and its practices, and mobilize around these injustices.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the first major U.S. policy
statements criticizing the KMT government were not made until the
Kaohsiung Incident and the murder of Henry Liu in the late 1970s and '80s,
giving the KMT a honeymoon period of nearly thirty years that would be
unheard of today. During this time the U.S. continued to provide military
and economic aid, despite the KMT's democratic setbacks, thus allowing
the KMT to consolidate its rule and modernize the Taiwanese economy.
Furthermore, by the time the U.S. finally started criticizing the KMT's
authoritarian rule, the U.S. had first allowed a generation of Taiwanese
citizens to grow up under the ideals, if not the reality, of democracy, and
push for reform from the inside.
F. Taiwan's Policies Leading to its Successful Democratization are
the Opposite of those Promoted by the U.S. Today
Arguably the most useful formulation defining the evasive task of
promoting democratization is that "when countries reach a certain social
and economic level, they enter a transition zone where the probability of
their moving in a democratic direction increases markedly. 22 ° The key
219 International Man & Wife of the Year, TIME, January 3, 1938, at 12, 14.
220 HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 86.
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question is whether there are some general principles the U.S. should apply
to help bring developing nations into this transition zone. While no
definitive conclusions can be drawn from one case study, the Taiwan
example shows that at the very least, present-day U.S. policies call on
incipient democracies to implement policies that depart radically from those
that brought about Taiwan's economic and democratic miracles.
1. Taiwan implemented only local elections first, which slowly
developed into national elections later
Fortunately for Taiwan's long term democratization prospects, Chiang
Kai-shek ignored the U.S.' tacit calls for immediate national elections, and
instead limited them to the local level. As Samuel Huntington states,
"Elections are the way a democracy operates.... [t]hey [are] a vehicle of
democratization as well as the goal of democratization. 22 1  National
elections implemented under external pressures lack the stability of self-
determination, and lend toward a backlash against democracy and its
proponents when they fail.222 In contrast, national elections develop
naturally and more stably when they are preceded by local elections.
Nevertheless, if there is one constant in U.S. foreign policy today, including
in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is the rhetoric that developing democracies must
implement national elections in the near future to qualify for U.S. aid and
support.
In the development of Taiwan's electoral process, the presidency was
not the first but rather the last office to be put to popular elections. The
KMT leadership would later justify this delay by pointing to the rush of
failed elections and democracies in Southeast Asia. When President Lee
Teng-hui finally opened the door to national elections after forty years of
KMT rule, Taiwan had already established a stable government and a well-
developed economy to take advantage of them.
Although the outcome of local elections had no real effect on KMT
policy for decades,224 they "provided opposition forces with institutional
channels for organizing the people and promoting political socialization.',
225
Local elections served as arenas for the development of electoral habits and
ideals, with voter turnout averaging 60-70%, and sometimes reaching
221 Id. at 174. Most studies pay attention to elections only "as a result of political change,
not as one of its causes." RIGGER, supra note 22, at 3.
222 "Many developing nations tried to democratize too quickly, especially by holding
elections prematurely..." COPPER, supra note 11, at 10.
2231 d. at 26.
224 Tien, supra note 60, at 4; See RIGGER, supra note 22, at 22.
225 Tien, supra note 60, at 5.
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80% 226 Furthermore, winning elections provided legitimacy to individual
opposition leaders, because "[s]uppressing isolated dissident intellectuals
was one thing; suppressing elected officials whose popularity had been
demonstrated at the polls... was another matter.' '227 Once local elections
were well-established, national elections were the logical next step, as the
Tang-wai and the DPP were all too eager to point out.
2. Taiwan's miracles arose out of thirty years of economic
protectionism
The Taiwan example presents a lesson on economic development
contrary to the current U.S. foreign policy that universally pushes for near-
term economic liberalization.
The KMT led Taiwan through rapid economic development in the
second half of the 20th century, almost all under a protectionist economy.
This is directly relevant to U.S. foreign policy goals of encouraging
democratization abroad, as in the words of Samuel Huntington, "Few
relationships between social, economic, and political phenomena are
stronger than that between level of economic development and existence of
democratic politics. 228
According to Dani Rodrik, contrary to the inflated claims of the World
Bank and the IMF, the relationship between growth rates and low tariffs is
weak at best.22 9 Along these same lines, Joseph Stiglitz argues that if
"markets are opened up for competition too rapidly, before strong financial
institutions are established, then jobs will be destroyed faster than new jobs
are created." Stiglitz cites as examples the failed IMF policies in most
Latin American countries, 230 and most strikingly, in Russia. 231 In contrast,
the countries of East Asia, including Taiwan, "embraced globalization
under their own terms, at their own pace," and thus have been able to reap
its benefits.232
226 Huat, supra note 58, at 136.
227 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 26.
228 HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 311.
229 RODRIK, supra note 33, at 25. Rodrick argues that it is "domestic investment that
ultimately makes an economy grow, not the global economy." Id. at 40. Rodrik discusses
the "Taiwan miracle," explaining that Incentives for domestic investment were provided by
the KMT, most importantly in the form of tax incentives, which established new industries,
and ensured that "key inputs were available locally for private producers downstream." Id.
at 53-54.
230 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCoNTENTs 18 (2002).
231 Id. at 185.
232 Id. at 20.
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Taiwan's protectionist economy encouraged "rapid economic growth,
especially in the industrial sector., 233  Within a generation, the KMT
dramatically raised living standards and transformed Taiwan from a minor
agricultural exporter into "an industrial and technological power and a
major player in the international trading system. 234
3. Taiwan's miracles arose out of thirty years of authoritarian rule
There is a long-standing debate among scholars over the possibility of
a positive relationship between authoritarian rule and economic
development. On one side of the debate, scholars point to Taiwan as a
paradigm of correct "sequencing," arguing that authoritarian rule
"generate[s] the stability and economic dynamism required to underpin a
successful capitalist democracy. 235 Under the most common formulation
of this theory, democratic reform is best carried out in stages, beginning
with the denial of basic civil and political rights to control labor, curb
consumption, and reward enterprise. Democratic reform can follow only
after the business community has strengthened to the point that it can237
ensure a continuation of growth-friendly policies and incentives.
Proponents of this theory point out that the "Taiwan miracle" took place
entirely under authoritarian rule.
Amartya Sen represents the other side of the debate, arguing that
"there is little evidence that authoritarian politics actually helps economic
growth." 238  Sen believes that the sequentialists' conclusions are
erroneously based on a small sample size comprising largely of South
Korea, Singapore, and post-reform China.239
While this article does not set out to prove Sen false, it does submit
that Taiwan should be added to this list. Furthermore, even if there is
nothing to indicate that the policies conducive to economic growth are best
233 Scalapino, supra note 21, x.
234 Bruce J. Dickson, Taiwan's Democratization: What Lessons for China?, in TAIWAN'S
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 115, 127 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).
235 Whitehead, supra note 183, at 168.
236 Id. at 179.
237 Id.
238 SEN, supra note 9, at 15. The policies generally accepted as conducive to economic
growth according to Sen are "openness to competition, the use of international markets, a
high level of literacy and school education, successful land reforms and public provision of
incentives for investment, exporting and industrialization." Id. at 150. See also Steve Tsang
& Hung-mao Tien, Preface and Acknowledgments , in DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN vi,
(Steve Tsang & Hung-mao Tien eds., 1999).
239 Id. at 149. See also Tsang & Tien, supra note 238, at vi.
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sustained by authoritarianism, Sen fails to acknowledge that in the right
conditions, authoritarian rule may provide the job security prerequisite for
rulers to push for major economic and democratic reform to begin with. At
the very least, the possibility that a period of authoritarian rule is not
inconsistent with and perhaps is even beneficial for future democratization
is one that the U.S. should factor into its foreign policy considerations.
4. KMT presidents pushed for democratization out of self-interest,
and only given their authoritarian powers
KMT presidents pushed for democratic reform out of their own self-
interests, and only under the belief that, with their authoritarian powers,
they could contain the effects of democratization. According to Bolivar
Lamounier, whether or not an authoritarian party decides to push for
political reform depends on its "calculation that it can control [its] pace anddirection. 2 40 Chiang Kai-shek implemented local elections, Chiang Ching-
kuo lifted martial law, and Lee Teng-hui implemented national elections
because they all needed to curry international favor and appease the masses.
None of them would likely have dared to push through such extensive
reform had they not had the KMT's domination of the electoral process and
infiltration of every facet of civil society in their back pockets.
Their mistake was the common one of short-sightedness, and this
would take a generation to fully develop. Like most authoritarian systems,
the KMT lacked strong feedback mechanisms regarding the support or
submissiveness of the public, and mistakenly believed the people would
continue supporting it after the implementation of local and national
elections. 241 The KMT contained the electoral process for decades, but it
rapidly spun out of its control in the 1980s and '90s.
U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Cold War, has focused
almost exclusively on supporting self-proclaimed democratic insurgents,
instead of encouraging democratic reform from within the ruling party.
Even the purpose for the U.S.' renewed support for the KMT starting in the
1950s was to prop what was in effect a rebel movement against Communist
China; it just happened to be converted into support for a ruling party as the
KMT ended up calling Taiwan its new home. Although opposition
movements are more likely to adopt U.S. calls for democracy, they are also
much less likely to rise to or maintain power. Furthermore, clearly
underlying U.S. directives for authoritarian nations to implement fair
elections is the implicit rationale that these tyrannical rulers would be voted
out. Not surprisingly, those in power are not particularly inclined to
implement such changes under these circumstances.
240 RIGGER, supra note 22, at 19.
241 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 182.
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The Taiwan example demonstrates that at least in nations that have an
"inhibited political center,' 242 it may be more fruitful for the U.S. to
encourage democratic reform from within the ruling party and push for
local, not national elections. An authoritarian ruler may be willing to put
the implementation of local elections on the bargaining table under the right
circumstances. Once local elections are in place, they themselves serve as
an impetus for further democratization. As Bruce Dickson points out, "The
evolution of the KMT... shows that elections can play an important role
even when they occur in a nondemocratic polity." 243 The very type of
authoritarian rule that the U.S. automatically opposes may in fact be a
prerequisite for a ruling party to decide that implementing democratic
reform would be in its own best interests.
V. Conclusion
Dr. Sun Yat-sen's plan for implementing democracy in stages
exhibited a patience sorely lacking in modem-day U.S. efforts to promote
democratization abroad. Dr. Sun, father of Taiwanese democracy, did not
call for immediate national elections or freedom of speech, primarily
because he believed the people were not ready for them. He envisioned an
initial period of political tutelage of at least six years,244 during which a
temporary party dictatorship would lay the foundation for democratic
reform by first modernizing the economy and educating the people .24  The
KMT officially declared this period of tutelage over before 1949.246 By
maintaining authoritarian rule and instituting only local elections, however,
the KMT in effect continued this period into the 1980s, until domestic and
international circumstances pushed it to implement democratic reform. The
development of Taiwanese democracy took place in the exact progression,
if not timeframe, laid out in Sun Yat-sen's plan, culminating in the first
democratic transition of power in China's 5,000 year history.
Taiwan's policies during its successful democratization were virtually
the opposite of those imposed by the U.S. on developing democracies
during the Cold War and today. The U.S. continues to make near-term
economic liberalization and implementation of national elections
prerequisites to U.S. aid, despite lacking much evidence that these policies
are actually conducive for reform. Furthermore, the U.S. focuses far too
much on supporting self-proclaimed democratic insurgents, instead of
242 Steve Tsang's term describing a government that feels the need to exert considerable
self-restraint in the exercise of its power. See supra Part IV.A.3.
243 Dickson, supra note 14, at 72.
244 Tozzi, supra note 18, at 1217.
245 See RIGGER, supra note 22, at 65.
246 id.
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encouraging democratic reform from within ruling parties. The U.S. heldback its criticisms of KMT corruption for decades, but only to preserve
Taiwan's pristine though false image as the "Free China" alternative to
Communist China. In the end, the rose-colored glasses worn by the U.S.had unwittingly allowed Taiwanese democracy to develop from within.
The lesson from the Taiwan example is that the U.S. should identify
and support ruling parties in developing nations that like Taiwan might be
willing to implement local elections. The U.S. should then letdemocratization take its course, without the constant threat of U.S. criticism
at every misstep. Local elections, even those not free of corruption, breeddemocracy. They both develop the voting habits in the populace, and serve
as a source of independent power for local leaders. Instead of pushing for
too much, too fast in incipient democracies, the U.S. should heed thelessons of de Tocqueville and of its own history: once electoral rights are
extended, there is no natural stopping point short of universal suffrage.24 7
247 "There is no more invariable rule in the history of society: the further electoral rights
are extended, the greater is the need of extending them; for after each concession the
strength of the democracy increases, and its demands increase with its strength. The
ambition of those who are below the appointed rate is irritated in exact proportion to the
great number of those who are above it. The exception at last becomes the rule, concession
follows concession, and no stop can be made short of universal suffrage." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 64 (HENRY REEVE, ESQ. TRANS.,vol. 1) (1835); See
Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner, Introduction, in GLOBAL DIVERGENCE OF DEMOCRACIES xi,
pg. 227 (Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner eds., 2001).
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